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Abstract
The history of Coca-Cola in Denmark in the early post-war years offers a fascinating case for
studying the close links between ColdWar politics, business interest and cultures of consumption.
In the early 1950s, the well-organised Danish beverage industry lobbied effectively to protect
their home market against the American soft-drink giant. The result was a special cola tax that
made production of cola drinks unprofitable in Denmark. This tax came under growing pressure
in the late 1950s and was eventually abandoned in 1959. Resistance to ‘America’s advance’
continued after 1959 as the Coca-Cola Company came to face strong competition from the local
Jolly Cola brand, produced by exactly the same business interests that had lobbied for the cola
tax six years earlier.
The history of Coca-Cola in Western Europe in the early post-war years offers
a fascinating case for studying the close links between Cold War politics, business
interest and cultures of consumption. In the United States the Coca-Cola Company
had successfully branded its product as closely linked to the ‘American way of life’
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598 Contemporary European History
in the inter-war period. This image was strengthened, and was projected globally,
during the Second World War when the company (having secured a lucrative contract
with the American military) pledged that every American G I would be able to get
an ice-cold Coke wherever he was sent.1 This secured Coca-Cola an iconic status.
When the American soft-drink producers entered the European market, typically in
the late 1940s, communist critics narrated this as yet another example of an American
imperialist plot to dominate the world. ‘Are we being Coca-Colonised’, the French
communist daily L’Humanité asked in 1949, while Italian communists coined terms
such as Coca-Colèra and Coca-Colitis.2
The opposition to Coca-Cola in France developed into a campaign to secure a
ban on the American soft drink that has been analysed in detail by the historian
Richard Kuisel.3 This campaign brought together a strange alliance ranging from
communists to Conservatives and wine producers. While French beverage producers
had a clearly protectionist agenda, the communists were not the only ones who
saw the issue as one with much wider ramifications. The Catholic newspaper
Témoignage chrétien described Coca-Cola as ‘the avant-garde of an offensive aimed
at economic colonisation’ while liberal Le Monde argued that the criticism of Coca-
Cola in reality was a criticism of ‘the civilisation . . . of which it is the symbol’.
At the height of the French polemic, the parliament voted in favour of a law that
would enable the government to ban Coca-Cola because it would pose a public
health risk (due to the content of phosphoric acid in the drink). However, a ban
was never realised. The government worried that banning Coca-Cola would have
serious repercussions for American–French relations, and in 1951 the Ministry of
Agriculture concluded that the drink conformed to French law. Yet, whereas the
Southern Europeans in France and Italy fought the American icon Coca-Cola –
and lost – in the two Nordic countries, Denmark and Sweden, local business and
national politicians chose less vocal but more efficient strategies. In Sweden cola
drinks were until 1952 virtually prohibited by law with reference to the content of
phosphoric acid.4
The most successful case of resistance was, however, to be found in Denmark.
Although Coca-Cola was originally marketed in Denmark in the 1930s, the American
company encountered massive difficulties in the Danish market for soft drinks after
the Second World War. It was only able to re-enter the market in 1959. When Coca-
Cola was finally relaunched in Denmark, the American company found itself in a
1 There are several histories of the Coca-Cola Company. See, for example, Alfred J. Kahn, The Big Drink:
The Story of Coca-Cola (New York: Random House, 1960); Frederick J. Allen, Secret Formula: How
Brilliant Marketing and Relentless Salesmanship Made Coca-Cola the Best-Known Product in the World (New
York: HarperBusiness, 1995); and Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country & Coca-Cola: The Definitive
History of the Great American Soft Drink and the Company That Makes It, (2nd edn, New York: Basic
Books, 2000).
2 Cf. Kahn, Big Drink, 25; Pendergrast, God, 238–40.
3 Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993), 52–69.
4 Kenneth Ahlborn and Urban Nilmander, Försvinnande god – en svensk läskhistoria (Stockholm: Nordiska
Museets Förlag, 2001), 88.
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unfamiliar situation as Coca-Cola was facing a very strong competition from a local
cola brand, Jolly Cola.
The history of Coca-Cola in post-war Denmark is clearly a complex trans-Atlantic
encounter of the sort that has for many years been analysed under the heading
of Americanisation. Since the late 1980s the dominant position in Americanisation
studies has been that Americanisation was not a simple transfer process. Transfer is not
just selective. The thing transferred is transformed in the process, as recipients adapt,
hybridise or creolise American originals to fit into new settings. In this interpretation
interest is focused primarily on the resources and capacities of those on the receiving
end. However, in recent years this interpretation has been challenged by researchers
who argue that the relationship of power should be taken into account and who point
out that this was a highly asymmetrical encounter between a global superpower and
European nation states. A prominent representative of this line of argument is the
American historian Victoria de Grazia, who in her book Irresistible Empire (2005)
analyses the successful penetration of Europe by American businesses in the mid-
twentieth century as the victory of a specific American form of consumer-oriented
capitalism over European capitalisms that were typically elite-oriented and focused
on well-established vested interests.5
This article draws on a similar analytical framework, combining political
and economic history with more culturalist analyses of the Cold War and
Americanisation.6 However, as we will demonstrate, the Danish case study can also be
used to question de Grazia’s fundamental claim of the irresistibility of the American
market empire. The empire – in our case the Coca-Cola Company – encountered
fierce resistance that in different forms was quite successful. In a first phase, in
the early 1950s, the well-organised beverage industry, building on a well-established
tradition for anti-competition behaviour, lobbied effectively to protect the home
market against the American competition. The result was a special cola tax, introduced
in 1953, that made production of cola drinks unprofitable in Denmark. This tax came
under growing pressure in the late 1950s and was eventually abandoned in 1959.
In this second phase lobbying by Coca-Cola and her Danish allies was important
but the policy change is better explained by looking at the changing economic
environment of the late 1950s, not just in Denmark but in Western Europe. Resistance
to ‘America’s advance’ continued after 1959 as the Coca-Cola Company came to face
strong competition from the local Jolly Cola brand, produced by exactly the same
business interests that persuaded the Danish government to introduce the cola tax
5 Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge,
MS: Belknap Press, 2005). A harsh critique of the ‘Creolisation Paradigm’ in Americanisation studies
from a methodological and theoretical perspective has been offered by Mel van Eltern, Americanism and
Americanization: A Critical History of Domestic and Global Influence (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2006),
esp. 101–61.
6 Cf. Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonisation and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States
in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), and
Robert H. Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997). See also Harm G. Schröter, ‘Economic Culture and its Transfer:
Americanization and European Enterprise, 1900–2005’, Revue économique, 58, 1 (2007), 215–29.
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six years earlier. In this third phase, the picture becomes much more complicated
as the resistance to Coca-Cola now was based on a strategy of copying Coca-Cola
while sale figures quickly demonstrated that Danish soft-drink consumers were more
than willing to become Americanised. The history of Coca-Cola’s encounter with
Denmark in the 1950s and early 1960s is, however, not only interesting as a case
of resistance and eventual adaptation. It also demonstrates that the outcome of this
American–European struggle to a high degree hinged on local actors rather than
American ones.
False beginnings
Coca-Cola was originally launched in Denmark in 1935. While competitors from the
breweries were very highly critical of the aggressive marketing of the drink, Coca-
Cola was not much of a success. Before the war ended production of Coca-Cola in
Denmark, total sales amounted to a meagre 2,155,264 bottles.7
Coca-Cola Export Corporation, however, still had hopes for the Danish market.
Shortly after the end of the war, the Danish solicitor Thorvald Mikkelsen, who had
been Coca-Cola’s Danish attorney since the late 1930s, met with representatives of the
corporation in New York. After the meeting, Mikkelsen noted that the Americans
‘were extremely interested in Scandinavia and have decided to build up a strong
market there’.8 The relaunch of Coca-Cola proved to be difficult, however. This
was due to the continuation of sugar rationing for several years after the war.9 With
limited sugar supplies, no Danish producer was interested in marketing a soft drink
under licence where part of the profits had to be sent abroad. At the same time, it was
evident that there was a potential market for Coca-Cola as can be seen from the fact
that several small soft-drink producers used this situation as an opportunity to invent
local cola drinks (such as Ritzy Cola, O’Cola and Happy Cola), and when it became
evident that sugar rationing would soon end, the Danish beverage producers started
to worry about the competition from Coca-Cola. Thus by 1951 ‘the Coca-Cola
question’ was ‘haunting’ the members of the ‘Association of soft-drink producers on
Funen’ according to the minutes from the annual general assembly.10
Based on this, it is not a surprise that optimism ran high in the Coca-Cola
Export Corporation when the end of sugar rationing was announced in 1953. In
a letter to the president of the corporation, Jim Curtis, H. B. Nicholson wrote in
March 1953 about rapid developments in the Scandinavian market and suggested that
Copenhagen would be the best location for a new Scandinavian office. ‘Norway is
7 ‘The Coca-Cola Company mod mineralvandsfabrikken “Balderskilde””, Højesteretstidende, 102, 1959,
252 (The figure was supplied by the Coca-Cola Company).
8 Erhvervsarkivet, archive no. 2117 (A/S Coca-Cola, mineralvand en gros, Købehavn), note by Thorvald
Mikkelsen, dated 8 Jan. 1946.
9 Paul Gersman et al., Dansk Toldhistorie, V. Fra importregulering til moms (Copenhagen: Toldhistorisk
Selskab, 1987), 298.
10 See Generalforsamlinger for Foreningen af Mineralvandsfabrikanter i Fyens Stift, Albanis Arkiv,
Stadsarkivet, Odense.
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not central’, he told his boss, and ‘Denmark is more receptive to foreign business men
and establishments than Sweden’. Copenhagen was preferred although Denmark was
the only Scandinavian country where Coca-Cola still was not on the market. Still,
Nicholson was an optimist due to rumours that Danish breweries were planning to
seek negotiations with Coca-Cola.11 His optimism proved ill founded. It was not the
Coca-Cola Company that Danish breweries contacted when sugar rationing came to
an end. They turned to the Danish government.
The making of the cola tax
The Danish beverage industry was very well organised. Most soft drinks producers
were also breweries and the industry was clearly dominated by the two giants, Tuborg
and Carlsberg, who had co-operated closely since the early twentieth century. The
two giants dominated not only the market but also the two interest organisations, the
Danish Brewers Association and the Association of Danish Soft-Drink Producers.12
Carlsberg and Tuborg also had close personal contact with leading political circles,
especially the Conservative Party. Thus the former Minister of Trade (1940–3) Halfdan
Hendriksen, between 1946 and 1953 combined his job as president for Carlsberg
with being a Conservative member of parliament (1924–57) and chairman of the
Conservative Party (1948–57), while the Minister of Trade (1950–3), the Conservative
Aage Rytter, had close contact with the two breweries and later became president of
Tuborg.13 With close links such as these it is not surprising that the beverage industry
turned to the political system for help when confronted with the American Coca-
Cola Company. In November 1952 the Association of Danish Soft-Drink Producers
wrote to the Minister of Finance, Torkild Kristensen. Their letter is a classic example
of lobbying using easily transparent codes. The Association started out by telling him
that several of its members were contemplating the production of cola drinks when
sugar rationing ended. Therefore – and this is the key message – the association
wished to know if the ministry had any plans regarding cola drinks. Was a ban as
seen in ‘some countries’ under consideration? Or maybe a special tax, since the
production of cola drinks under the current tax on soft drinks would probably result
in a dramatic decline in beer consumption and therefore a decline in state revenue
from the beer tax. To avoid losses for the Treasury, ‘a bottle containing 20 centilitres
of cola drink would have to be taxed with 25 øre in order to lift the price to a level
that would create a balance between the demand for cola drinks on the one hand
and that for wine and beer on the other.’ Or did the minister plan to give cola drinks
11 Letter from H. B. Nicholson, Jr., Casablanca, to J. F. Curtis, Coca-Cola Export Corporation, New
York, 17 March 1953, in Coca-Cola Archives, Atlanta.
12 This was documented in a report by the Danish Trust Commission from 1949. See Betænkning
vedrørende konkurrenceforholdene for øl og mineralvand, The Danish Trust Commission of 31 March 1949,
Public Report No. 246 (Copenhagen 1960), 56; Bent Hjejle, Hof eller Tuborg: Konkurrence og fusion
1895–970 (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1982).
13 See Hans Bølling et al., Halfdan Hendriksen: En dansk købmand og politiker (Copenhagen: Aschehoug,
1956), 235–9; Kraks Blå Bog (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1958), 585.
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‘unrestricted access to the Danish market, thus renouncing any attempt to stabilise
either the Danish economy or the fiscal aspects of the state budget’?14
The real agenda of the beverage producers is evident. They wanted legislation
that made it impossible for the Coca-Cola Company (and other foreign cola drink
producers such as the Pepsi-Cola Company) to become serious competitors in the
Danish market. Their argument, focusing on both national industrial interests and
the fiscal interests of the government, was positively received in the Ministry of
Finance. Although evidence shows that the ministry considered a ban,15 in the end it
opted for a special tax on cola drinks. The proposal for this tax was introduced into
a larger temporary law on excise taxes between the first and the second reading of
the law in parliament.16 Torkild Kristensen explained the tax by arguing that it had
been demonstrated that cola drinks with their caffeine content (and ‘a rather strong
stimulating effect’) were competing with both soft drinks and especially beers:
If these cola drinks gained popularity in our country, it would probably be detrimental to the sale
of beer and therefore offer a problem not just for the breweries but also for the public finances, as
beer sales are a substantial source of government income. Based on this, it will only be fair if these
drinks competing with beer become subject to a relatively high level of taxation.17
Thus Kristensen closely followed the argument outlined by the beverage industry.
Although the suggested level of taxation at one krone per litre was lower that the
1.25 krones suggested by the industry, it was dramatically higher than the general
soft-drink tax, which stood at 0.12 krones per litre. In parliament, an overwhelming
majority – consisting of the government parties (Liberals and Conservatives) and of
the dominant opposition parties (Social Democrats and Social Liberals) – supported
the proposed tax package including the new cola drink tax, which became effective
from 1 April 1953. The cola tax was only one small part of a comprehensive tax and
duties reform and the only verbalised opposition to the cola tax came from the small
pro-free-market Georgist party, Retsforbundet.18 The party’s spokesman criticised the
tax for going against temperance interests as ‘coca-cola probably would be consumed
instead of beer’.19 These positions had not changed when the government – now
a Social Democratic minority government – asked parliament to prolong the tax
package in November 1953.20
14 Letter from Danske Mineralvandsfabrikanter to the Minister of Finance, 17 Nov. 1952, in Rigsarkivet,
Departementet for Told- og Forbrugsafgifter, 1. forbrugsafgiftkontor, file 38 B-3082: Cola-sagen.
15 Letter from ‘Toldvæsnets Prøvesamling’ to Tolddepartementet, 16 Oct. 1953, Rigsarkivet,
Departementet for Told- og Forbrugsafgifter, 1. forbrugsafgiftkontor, file 38 B-3082: Cola-sagen,
1. forbrugsafgiftskontor.
16 The temporary character of the excise tax laws was to a high degree a technicality. Although the laws
were only to be in force for a specific period of time, they were normally prolonged with only minor
revisions.
17 Rigsdagstidende 1952–3, Landstingets Forhandlinger, col. 1007.
18 Retsforbundet was founded in 1919 based on the ideas of the American economist and philosopher
Henry George. It combines George’s idea of a single tax on land with liberalistic anti-state and free
trade thinking.
19 Rigsdagstidende 1952–3, Folketingets Forhandlinger, col. 3922.
20 Folketingstidende 1953–4, Forhandlingerne, col. 1140–68, 1576–94, 1868.
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The special tax on cola drinks was prohibitive. Demand for cola drinks in
Denmark all but disappeared. For the beverage industry the tax was an evident
victory. The ‘cola question’ had been successfully solved from the perspective of
Danish producers. In this, the Danish case differs from other European encounters
with Coca-Cola. In the post-war years, local economic interests often failed to
persuade governments to introduce protectionist measures against the feared invasion
of the charismatic American soft drink, and France is the best-known example
of this; however, campaigns against Coca-Cola failed in other European countries
too, and in 1952 Sweden actually abolished a law banning phosphoric acid in food
thus opening the Swedish market for Coca-Cola.21 Another striking difference is
that the Coca-Cola issue did not lead to any debates resembling the French outcry
against Coca-Colonisation or Italian warnings against ‘Coca-Cholera’. In Denmark
the communists, due to their general opposition to indirect taxation, actually ended
up indirectly supporting Coca-Cola and American interests by voting against the cola
tax twice in 1953.
There are several explanations for this. An important one is timing. In 1949, it
was easy to link Coca-Cola to the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Treaty – two key
examples of growing American influence in early Cold War Europe. In Denmark,
sugar rationing meant that Coca-Cola only became an issue in 1953 when the alliance
with the United States was a well-established fact. A second reason is the weak
position of Danish communists. It is hard to see how they could have launched a
campaign against Coca-Cola as an example of American imperialism in the early
1950s. Instead, they argued in mainly domestic terms against indirect taxation as
socially unfair. Third, while the communists would not, at least on their own, have
been strong enough to mount a strong campaign, the beverage industry certainly
was. This was exactly what they did by contacting the government in 1952. As this
strategy was successful there was no need for a public campaign. Finally, and most
importantly, there was little room for an anti-American Coca-Cola campaign in
Denmark as all major parties supported the cola tax and furthermore framed it as a
purely fiscal issue. Coca-Cola was subject to taxation not because it was American or
because it was unhealthy but because it was bad for the state budget and influential
Danish business interests. A central element in this strategy was that the tax was a
general tax against all cola drinks. The government carefully avoided the brand name
of Coca-Cola when the tax was introduced.
Fighting the cola tax
While the introduction of the cola tax did not create a great stir either in parliament
or in the media, representatives of the Coca-Cola Company quickly started protesting
against the tax that they systematically referred to as ‘the Coca-Cola Tax’. Shortly
after the passing of the law, Coca-Cola Company’s Danish lawyer characterised
21 For France see Kuisel, Seducing. For Sweden see Ahlborn and Nilmander, Forsvinnande, 88.
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the law in a letter to the Ministry of Finance as a tax on an American product
and thus an infringement of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
regulations. However, the ministry rejected this interpretation, pointing out that
all drinks containing cola, including Danish ones, were subject to the tax. This
was not a matter of trade discrimination, and ‘cola’ was ‘simply a botanical term’.22
However, Coca-Cola and its Danish partners did give up the struggle against the tax.
In early 1954, the Coca-Cola Export Corporation asked for a meeting with the
State Department to discuss ‘the Danish discriminatory tax on Coca-Cola’. In a letter
to the State Department prior to the meeting that took place in February, Michael
Deane from the corporation detailed the arguments of Coca-Cola. He pointed out
that as a source of revenue the tax so far had been a fiasco and would continue to be
so ‘as long as this discriminatory tax prevents the bottling of Coca-Cola in Denmark’.
Deane debunked the key argument that sales of Coca-Cola ‘could adversely affect the
revenue derived from the tax on the sale of beer’ as ‘surveys taken in Europe indicate
that Coca-Cola is no threat to beer sales’. Accordingly Coca-Cola asked the State
Department to make a formal complaint against the tax to the Danish government.23
The State Department accepted Coca-Cola’s arguments and the direct result of
the meeting was a formal note from the American Embassy in Copenhagen to the
Danish government. However, the Danish Ministry of Finance stuck to its guns and
told the American Embassy that the tax could not be considered discriminatory, as
Danish products were also subject to the tax. Over the next years the American
Embassy, Coca-Cola’s Danish attorney, and the company DADEKO that had signed
a contract to bottle Coca-Cola in eastern Denmark, all raised the issue of the tax
with the Danish authorities several times but to no avail. An internal note from
the Ministry of Finance’s Office of Customs and Excise Duties in February 1955
neatly summarised the official rationale for the tax but also more than hinted that
the beverage industry held something very close to a right of veto in all discussions
concerning the cola tax:
The tax on products containing cola was introduced because it was believed that a strongly advertised
Coca-Cola drink would be a serious competitor to Danish beer and thus detrimental to government
revenue from the beer tax. . . . The Office [of customs and excise taxes] has received no information
that the Danish beer industry has changed its position on this matter.24
Within the Danish government the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the only sceptical
voice arguing that the cola tax was not only in conflict with international trade
22 The correspondence is held at Rigsarkivet, Departementet for Told- og Forbrugsafgifter, 1.
forbrugsafgiftkontor, file 38 B-3082: Cola-sagen.
23 Letter from Michael Deane, Coca-Cola Export Corporation, to Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State, 2 Feb. 1954; Letter from Michael Deane, Coca-
Cola Export Corporation, to Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Department of State, 18 Feb. 1954 and Department of State. Memorandum of Conversation. Subject:
Danish excise tax on ‘cola-containing goods’, 18 Feb. 1954, National Archives, RG 59 Department of
State, Decimal File, 1950–4, Box 5137, File: 85911/12–450.
24 Internal note from the Office of Customs and Excise Taxes, Feb. 1955, in Rigsarkivet, Departementet
for Told- og Forbrugsafgifter, 1. forbrugsafgiftkontor, file 38 B-3082: Cola-sagen. The correspondence
between the various parties and the Ministry of Finance are all kept in this file.
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agreements but also might harm Danish agricultural export interests.25 However,
such claims were put aside by the Ministry of Finance and there are no signs that such
worries entered the parliamentary scene in the first years following the introduction
of the tax. In the early 1950s concerns about the state budget had priority over
international trade agreements. From the mid-1950s this began to change. Growing
Danish exports underlined the importance of international regulation of trade and
tariffs.26 Especially agricultural interests became concerned because the traditional
dominant export market, Britain, could not absorb a growing Danish production
and the industry started to look for new markets, including the United States.27 In
parliament the Liberal Party defended agricultural interests, arguing in favour of free
trade, whereas the Conservatives with traditional close relations with industry were
more reluctant and defended protectionist policies until the late 1950s. For the Social
Democrats economic growth and high employment were the main concerns, as a
generation of academically trained economists took over leading positions in the
party exports, and international trade became an increasingly important issue.28 This
general shift in Danish trade policy orientation also came to influence the discussion
on the cola tax.
The first signs that the situation was about to change came in a parliamentary
debate on excise tax legislation in February 1957. Although the cola tax was not up
for discussion, the issue was introduced by the spokesman for the Liberal Party, now
the major party of the opposition to the Social Democratic government. He said:
We have been approached by the people who produce the non-alcoholic drink called Coca-Cola.
This drink is taxed by 1 krone per litre compared to the taxation of 20 øre per litre for other
non-alcoholic drinks that are comparable to Coca-Cola. We find that this tax is very high and
suggest that the standing committee on customs looks into whether it can be lowered somewhat
between the second and the third reading of the law.29
This is the first evidence we have of a positive effect of the lobbying of the Coca-Cola
interests. When the parliamentary committee was debating the proposed legislation
in detail, Coca-Cola’s Danish business partner DADEKO was given the opportunity
to present its arguments to the main political parties. There were two basic arguments.
First, the introduction of Coca-Cola would not have an adverse effect on the balance
of payments, as expenditure on the Coca-Cola syrup to be bought in the USA was
negligible and DADEKO’s production would be based on ‘machinery, bottles, cases
25 This discussion started in 1953 and went on in the following years. See the correspondence between
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Trade and Tariffs in Rigsarkivet, Departementet fory Told-
og Forbrugsafgifter, 1. forbrugsafgiftkontor, file 38 B-3082: Cola-sagen.
26 Rasmus Mariager, I tillid og varm sympati: Dansk-britiske forbindelser og USA under den tidlige kolde krig
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2008), 558; Jan Pedersen, Danmarks økonomiske historie
1910–1960 (Copenhagen: Multivers, 2010).
27 Henrik Nissen, Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie, vol. 14: Da landet blev by, 1950–1970
(Copenhagen: Gyldendal and Politiken, 1991), 62–5.
28 Hans Kryger Larsen, Industri, stat og samfund 1939–1972 (Odense: University of Southern Denmark
Press, 2008), 179–92.
29 Folketingstidende, Forhandlingerne 1956–7, col. 2800. The general tax on soft drinks had been raised
from 12 øre to 20 øre in 1955.
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and sugar produced in Denmark’. Instead, ‘this new business venture will, in general,
generate new employment’. DADEKO further reiterated the argument that evidence
from other European countries demonstrated that fears that Coca-Cola would crowd
out beer were unfounded.30
The intervention of the Liberal Party in favour of Coca-Cola did not lead to the
immediate abolition of the tax. However, the work of the standing committee was a
decisive turning point as it showed that only a small parliamentary majority, consisting
of the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, supported the current tax, while both
the Liberals and the Social Liberals argued for a reduction of the tax. Thus the pro-tax
alliance was breaking down. This has to be understood in the light of the broader
debate on Danish trade policies discussed above. The Liberals defended agricultural
export interests and the Conservatives were speaking for industrial interests in favour
of protected home markets. The Social Democrats were caught in the middle but
in the short term defended the tax. The matter now also caught media interest.
In an editorial, the important Social Liberal newspaper Politiken argued against the
tax, labelling it ‘a despicable piece of protectionist policy’, and the business-friendly
Børsen reported on the opposition of the temperance movement to the high taxation
of cola drinks.31
The Coca-Cola Export Corporation evidently monitored Danish developments
closely and intensified its campaign against the cola tax. In April 1957 two high-
ranking representatives of Coca-Cola arrived in Copenhagen, and in an interview in
a popular newspaper, Alexander Makinsky – who had been the company’s front-line
man in the French ‘Coca-Cola War’ seven years earlier32 – explained the issue from
the perspective of Coca-Cola. According to Makinsky,
This is a strange story. Denmark and Portugal are the only two countries in the world outside
the Iron Curtain where you cannot get Coca-Cola, and I have to admit that we do not really
understand why Coca-Cola in Denmark is taxed with 1 krone per litre.
Asked whether Coca-Cola had experienced problems elsewhere, Makinsky
responded:
There have been difficulties but they have been overcome . . . Where resistance has existed, there
have been two causes. First, the old story that cola content in the beverage can be harmful. This
is pure nonsense . . . Another and more interesting hindrance has been the fact that Coca-Cola in
many countries has been a symbol of and synonymous with the concept of the USA. Naturally,
this is flattering for us – but it has also, in some places, created difficulties because opponents of
the USA did not want the ‘American drink’ allowed. Well, now it is only behind the Iron Curtain
that the opposition exists.33
30 ‘Nyt fremstød for Coca-Cola in Denmark’, Politiken, 6 March 1957. No files from the work of the
parliamentary committee debating the tax have survived in the archive of the Folketing. Mr Thorvald
Mikkelsen was a major shareholder in DADEKO which probably explains why this company with no
experience in soft-drink production was granted the contract by Coca-Cola Export Corporation.
31 ‘En krone’, Politiken, 2 April 1957, and ’En amerikansk Røst i Sagen om Coca-Cola’, Børsen, 3 April
1957.
32 Cf. Allen, Secret Formula, 1–2.
33 Ekstra Bladet, 2 April 1957.
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While the issue had thus far been interpreted in Denmark in purely economic terms,
Makinsky introduced the Cold War politics that had been a crucial element in the
battle over Coca-Cola in countries such as France. In his analysis, the cola tax put
Denmark well beyond the pale of Western democracies in Europe, comparing it to
authoritarian Portugal and the communist bloc.
In the final reading of the law in parliament, the cola tax was passed once again.
However, the debate demonstrated that it was under strong pressure. The Liberal
Party reiterated the arguments of the Coca-Cola interests, while the Social Liberals
echoed the position put forward in Politiken. Adding to this, the party’s spokesman
pointed to what he considered a main explanation for the tax, ‘the fact of the matter
is that breweries in Denmark always have had considerable political clout, and this
is demonstrably still the case’. This provoked a rejoinder from the Social Democrats
that ‘if the tax was reduced we will let another capitalist interest into the country,
one that is much stronger than the Danish beer capital’. The Social Democrats also
issued stern warnings that Coca-Cola Company did business very differently from
Danish producers, with massive marketing campaigns ‘well beyond the capabilities of
our small provincial producers, and if the large breweries have to take up competition
using the same methods I’m afraid that we will soon see a demand for tax reductions
. . . This is why we cannot accept a reduction of the tax.’34
Thus the cat was out of the bag. The tax was not just a fiscal issue but a clear
protectionist measure in favour of the Danish beverage industry, shielding it from
aggressive American competition. This was also the conclusion reached by many
newspapers. While Social Democrat and Conservative newspapers played down the
debate by referring to it as ‘entertaining’, the headline in the populist Ekstra Bladet
was ‘victory for Beer in the Folketing [the Danish parliament]’.35
In the short term Coca-Cola’s offensive was unsuccessful. However, the debate on
the tax was clearly gaining momentum and was to some extent driven by ideological
views on protection versus free trade, as well as a critique of the strong political
influence of the Danish breweries. At the same time the issue of the tax was contained
in a local, national framework. It is telling that the only actor to introduce the broader
context of the Cold War and (potential) Anti-Americanism was the Coca-Cola
Company, through its representatives.
The demise of the cola tax
As pressure on the cola tax grew over the next year both in parliament and in the
press, the beverage industry became worried. In April 1958 Einar Dessau, president
of Tuborg and chairman of the Association of Danish Soft-Drink Producers, wrote
the Minister of Finance. Due to rumours of a reduction of the tax he wanted to
34 Folketingstidende 1956–7. Folketingets Forhandlinger, cols. 3657–60.
35 See Social-Demokraten, Fyens Stifttidende, Ekstra Bladet and Herning Folkeblad, all 4 April 1957; Aarhus
Stifttidende and Jydske Tidende, 5 April 1957; Roskilde Tidende, 8 April 1957, and Jyllandsposten, 13. April
1957.
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explain the whole cola issue from the perspective of the industry. He restated the
industry’s arguments about the fiscal and industrial problems posed by Coca-Cola
but also added new ones. The aggressive sales methods of Coca-Cola would be
copied by Danish producers, leading to more expensive products for the consumers.
Furthermore, Coca-Cola was a threat to the traditional non-alcoholic Danish malt
beer (hvidtøl) and ‘we find it wrong that the position of malt beer in the market would
be partly taken over by beverages foreign to a Danish mentality’.36 A parallel argument
is found in a letter, dated two weeks earlier, stating that ‘the industry does not want
to crowd out the more natural soft drinks that Danish consumers evidently like with
the foreign cola drinks’. Thus, a cultural or even identity argument was added to the
economic ones. The growing support for Coca-Cola among politicians and in the
press was explained as ‘the result of an aggressive and biased propaganda launched
by a large foreign company seeking monopoly status’, and it was stressed that the
business methods of Coca-Cola were aggressive and un-Danish, through reference
to intensive and ‘very American’ marketing. Even worse,
using a plethora of methods, the company has tried to do something completely unheard of, that
is forcing the Danish government to reduce a domestic tax on certain stimulating soft drinks,
and political allies [of the company] have hinted at the risk of problems for the import of Danish
agricultural products in America if the company’s demands were not accepted.37
It is rather ironic to see a representative of the duopoly of Carlsberg and Tuborg
complaining about a ‘monopoly seeking’ company. But the key factor is, of course,
that the company was foreign. In their new line of argument the Danish breweries
and soft-drink producers clearly presented Coca-Coca as an alien entity, making
the most of the foreignness of both the company and the drink itself. They also
stressed that the Coca-Cola Company was ‘large’ and thus indirectly linked their
argument to a constituent element in Danish national identity: that Denmark is a
small nation besieged by large and powerful neighbours. By contrasting Coca-Cola
to ‘more natural’ Danish soft drinks, they even labelled the drink as unnatural.
During the 1950s Danish industry had gradually come to play a more important
role as exporter of goods and in 1958/9 industrial exports for the first time outgrew
agricultural exports.38 Consequently, the Social Democratic government put emphasis
on international free trade and trade agreements. This was clearly demonstrated by
the Danish participation in the negotiations establishing a free trade region with other
OEEC countries.39 In this context the final stage in the protracted battle about the
cola tax was fought in late 1958.
36 Letter from Einar Dessau to Minister of Finance, Viggo Kampmann, 28 April 1958, in Rigsarkivet,
Departementet for Told- og Forbrugsafgifter, 1. forbrugsafgiftkontor, file 38 B-3082: Cola-sagen. Our
italics.
37 A copy of the letter, dated 15 April 1958, is in the archive of the Albani Breweri, Stadsarkivet, Odense,
Albanis Arkiv: Box 8.
38 Erling Olsen and Erik Hoffmeyer, Dansk pengehistorie 1914–1960 (Copenhagen: Danmarks
Nationalbank, 1968), 278–81; Larsen, Industri, 117–235.
39 Torsten Borring Olesen and Poul Villaume, Dansk Udenrigspolitiks historie, vol. 5: I blokopdelingens tegn
1945–1972 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2006), 379–444.
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When the laws on excise taxes had to be revised as part of a new customs law, the
Liberals persuaded the Minister of Finance, Viggo Kampmann, that the cola tax was
one of the topics that the standing committee for customs could consider.40 In the
committee, a majority agreed to propose that all soft drinks should be taxed at 20 øre
per litre – which would mean dropping the special tax on cola drinks.
The Danish breweries and soft-drink producers did not admit defeat easily. Instead
they publicly promised that they would produce a cola drink and make it available
nationwide by April 1959 if ‘the existing tax on cola drinks is upheld’.41 It was a
peculiar offer. With existing tax levels, a bottle of cola drink could cost approximately
50% more than other soft drinks. This was clearly a prohibitive price, as demonstrated
by the very low revenue – ca. DKr 10,000 – produced by the cola tax annually.42
What the beverage industry was promising was to establish a production bound to
generate losses, and the proposal is highly telling of the industry’s fear of Coca-Cola.
In the light of the erosion of support for the tax, the proposal appears to be a
desperate rearguard action. The Coca-Cola Company, however, took it seriously
and sent representatives to Copenhagen once more. They contacted the American
ambassador, Val Peterson, and asked him to discuss the issue with the Danish
government. In early December, Peterson met with Foreign Minister Jens Otto
Krag and Viggo Kampmann. Both assured him that the breweries’ latest offensive
would fail.43 They were right. The second and third reading of the law in parliament
demonstrated that a solid majority consisting of the Social Democrats and the well-
established opponents of the tax (the Liberal Party, the Social Liberals and the
Georgists) was in favour of reducing the tax on cola drinks to the same level as that on
other soft drinks. This left a strange alliance of the Conservatives who opposed the
elimination of the tax and the communists who finally spoke out against American
‘monopoly capital’ and the ‘sour liquid’ that they claimed to be a health risk.44
Analysed from a comparative perspective, it is striking that the Danish special
tax on cola drinks which effectively blocked the Danish market for Coca-Cola was
introduced when similar attempts had failed as in France or was dismantled as in
Sweden. It is even more interesting that the symbolic status of Coca-Cola as an icon
for the American way of life (and American economic and political power) played a
completely marginal role in Danish debates. Only the Coca-Cola Company stressed
this aspect, which had been crucial in debates in France, Italy and elsewhere. The
Cold War never set the framework for the debates and, tellingly, the communists voted
against the tax in 1953. When they changed their tune in 1958, the anti-American
40 Folketingstidende, Folketingets Forhandlinger 1958–9, cols. 659–74. For Kampmann’s position in Feb.,
see idem., 1957–8, cols. 2626–7.
41 Letter from Danske Mineralvandsfabrikanters Fællesråd to the Folketing’s committee for customs and
excise taxes, 25 Nov. 1958, in Folketingets Bibliotek og Arkiv, Toldudvalget. The letter was originally
produced by The Association of Breweries and was also distributed to the press.
42 For this figure, see Folketingstidende. Forhandlingerne 1956–7, col. 3652.
43 Letter from Ambassador Val Peterson to Department of State, 9 Dec. 1958, in National Archives, RG
59 General Records of the Dep State. 1955–9 Central Decimal File, Box 4703, File 859.312/1–356.
44 Folketingstidende. Folketingets forhandlinger 1958–9, col. 1662.
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tenor of their arguments was weak. Instead, their main objective in the parliamentary
debates in 1958 was to taunt the Social Democrats for having changed their position
on the issue. In many ways, the history of the tax is best understood as an example
of successful business lobbying, first by the Danish beverage industry, then by the
Coca-Cola Company. While the Danish breweries and soft-drink producers in 1952
simply used the industry’s excellent connections to the political system, the Coca-
Cola Company not only tried to argue their case directly to the government but
also made use of the American government and of their Danish business partners’
contacts with Danish political parties and with the press. These lobbying efforts were
crowned by success in late 1958.
However, to understand the fall of the cola tax, we need to look at some broader
contexts. First, one of the recurring arguments in favour of the tax – that the
introduction of Coca-Cola would be a problem for the balance of payments and
widen the problematic dollar gap for Denmark – lost force. This was not so much
because the Coca-Cola interests convincingly argued that dollar costs would be
small but more importantly because of the international liberalisation of currency
regulations in the late 1950s. Second, it is hardly an accident that the opposition
to the tax gathered strength at a time when European economic integration and
free trade initiatives dominated the economic policy agenda. Although Denmark
was not a signatory power to the Rome Treaty in 1957, many in Denmark were
in favour of Danish membership, including the Liberal Party.45 This explains why
the Liberals (who actually introduced the tax in 1953) changed their position after
1957. That opposition to the tax could be linked to a more general opposition to
market regulation was also important for a party traditionally closely associated with
a liberalist ideology – as comments in the liberal press demonstrate. This analysis
is also valid for the Social Liberals who also changed their position on the tax
from 1957. Third, the pro-tax coalition was undermined by the fact that Denmark
from May 1957 was governed by a coalition dominated by the Social Democrats
but including the Social Liberals and the Georgists Party who were in favour of
lifting the tax.46 Fourth, the Social Democrats also became more reluctant as the
party came to view export and trade as an important element in its strategy for
modernising the Danish economy and building up the welfare state.47 This was stated
by Minister of Finance Viggo Kampmann in his December 1958 meeting with Val
Peterson, when Kampmann distanced himself from the tax stating that ‘the tax was
not one he had introduced’.48 This was rather disingenuous as he had defended the
tax on several occasions since becoming Minister of Finance in 1953. It might be that
the Social Democrats were succumbing to the continued campaign by the Coca-
Cola Company or even had been convinced by their basic argument that the tax
did not make economic sense. But more importantly the governing party started
45 Olesen and Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn, 402–31.
46 Jyllands-Posten, 21 Jan. 1959.
47 Klaus Petersen, Legitimität und Krise: Die politische Geschichte des dänischen Wohlfahrtsstaates 1945–1973
(Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998); Pedersen, Danmarks økonomiske historie.
48 Letter from Val Peterson to Department of State, 9. Dec. 1958, cit.
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linking the issue to the trend towards trade liberalisation and anti-protectionism. Due
to the successful campaigning of Coca-Cola and its Danish partners the cola tax
had become a symbol of national protectionism that did not fit well with the new
expansionist economic policy that the government introduced in 1957.49 Central to
this was the attempt to stimulate industrial development through foreign investments.
That meant primarily American investments, and in the 1957 pamphlet Investment of
Foreign Capital in Denmark the government claimed that ‘American citizens can do
business on equal terms with Danish citizens’.50 The whole issue of the cola tax could
be seen as a contradiction of that statement.
The cola war
When parliament voted to abolish the special cola tax in December 1958, the
Danish producers earned a small concession. The tax would remain in force for
the first six months of 1959, giving Danish breweries and soft-drink producers some
time to come up with strategies for facing the new competition. The industry
made the most of this concession. In November 1958 the association of soft-drink
producers had established a special ‘cola committee’ with the brief of looking into
the possibilities for the joint production of a Danish cola drink ‘if the cola tax
was reduced to less than 60 øre per litre’.51 For this purpose the committee met
with representatives from the Swedish and Norwegian industries in the middle of
December. In both countries there had been attempts to launch national brands
but they had failed. The president of the Norwegian Nora breweries even reported
that the massive marketing campaign for the local Isi-Cola ended up benefiting the
American brands. Based on such dispiriting information, the committee engaged in
negotiations with Coca-Cola’s main competitor, the Pepsi-Cola Company. These
negotiations broke down in January, however, as the Americans doubted whether
the Danes would commit themselves wholeheartedly to the successful launch of
Pepsi-Cola.
This was a valid analysis. A dominant theme running through the debates of the
‘cola committee’ was that while the Danish producers did not want to leave the
field to Coca-Cola they also wanted to come up with a strategy that would create
as little buzz (and publicity) about cola drinks as possible. The industry clearly was
thinking of the issue as a zero sum game. Vice-president Rytter from the Tuborg
Brewery expressed the dominant opinion when he stated that ‘a Danish cola drink
49 Cf. Hanne Rasmussen and Mogens Rüdiger, Danmarks Historie – Tiden efter 1945 (Copenhagen:
Gyldendal, 1990), 155–8.
50 Investment of Foreign Capital in Denmark, n.d. (but 1957), 5. See also Peter Sørensen and Kenn Tarbensen,
‘Det multinationale gennembrud’, Den Jyske Historiker, 109 (2005).
51 The following is based on the copies of the papers from this ‘cola committee’ held at the archive of
the Odense brewery Albani. See Stadsarkivet Odense, Albanis Arkiv, Box 29; Bestyrelsesmøder, file:
A/S Dansk Coladrik 1959–66.
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would enable us to keep sales at a low level which will be the best solution for the
breweries’.52
This mental framework changed dramatically after the break-down of the
negotiations with Pepsi-Cola. In a meeting on 13 January 1959 the committee agreed
to launch a Danish cola drink, and two weeks later detailed plans for the establishment
of a new company, A/S [limited liability company] Dansk Coladrik, jointly owned
by the eighteen largest breweries and soft-drink producers, were discussed. The
envisaged construction was a clear copy of the Coca-Cola set-up with a central
firm producing syrup, controlling quality and marketing strategies, while the firms
involved would serve as bottlers. Copying included producing a syrup that achieved
a taste as close to Coca-Cola as possible, and even the first suggested name for the
Danish cola, O-la Cola was based on an argument that this was as close as one could
get to Coca-Cola and still win a lawsuit about brand infringement. President Einar
Dessau from Tuborg opposed this reasoning, however, arguing ‘that even if a law suit
could be won, it would be something that Coca-Cola could use in their marketing
and thus still be an advantage for the Americans’. Instead, the committee settled on
the brand name Jolly Cola, and Dansk Coladrik was formally established 17 April
1959.
The decision to market a Danish cola brand also marked a decisive shift in another
sense. From the discussions of the board of Dansk Coladrik it is clear that the Danish
producers left behind their pessimistic analyses – rooted in an understanding of
the soft-drink and beer market as being inflexible – and embraced the (American)
credo of mass consumerism. The ambition now was to sell as many Danish cola
drinks as possible. This is evident from the marketing strategy of Dansk Coladrik,
which was clearly inspired by the ‘intensive and American’ sales methods the Danish
producers had bemoaned when they argued in favour of the cola tax. The advertising
firm Eberlin designed a brand logo for Jolly Cola and came up with advertisements
linking Jolly Cola to youthfulness and leisure, and catchy slogans such as ‘for it’s a jolly
good cola’ – in English and clearly referring to the traditional song that most Danes
had learned in their English classes in school. It is telling that there are no references
to Jolly Cola as the genuinely Danish cola in the advertisement material. Instead, the
first visual advertisement depicted a group of young people enjoying life on lawn of a
large suburban villa that would fit much better in the United States than in Denmark
of the late 1950s.53 However, the main marketing ploy was to present Jolly Cola as
‘the large cola’. This highlighted the fact that Jolly Cola was marketed in the standard
Danish soft-drink bottles containing 25 centilitres as opposed to the 6 oz. (or 19 cl.)
Coca-Cola bottles – and sold at the same price. It is hardly a coincidence that this
echoes back to one of Pepsi-Cola’s most successful slogans – ‘the full 12 ounces’ – in
its struggle against Coca-Cola in the American market.54
52 Minutes from meeting of cola partners, 13 Jan. 1959, Albanis Arkiv, Box B29: Bestyrelsesmøder, file:
A/S Dansk Coladrik 1959–66 (Stadsarkivet Odense).
53 The copy of the advertisement is preserved in the archive of Albani Brewery, cit.
54 Cf. Richard S. Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America (New York: Basic
Books, 1990), 73–95.
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Using the standard bottle was also framed as a service to the retailers, where the
argument fell on sympathetic ears. In June 1959 the trade magazine of the general
retailers encouraged members to buy the Danish cola in order to avoid ‘the plague of
rifled bottles’.55 The support of the retailers was of crucial importance for the success
of the Jolly Cola, as this was the precondition for the drink being available ‘here,
there and everywhere’ (‘her, der og allevegne’) – to quote another of the launching
slogans.
Availability was a problem for Coca-Cola. DADEKO had prepared for production
for a long time and opened a bottling plant in June 1959 with a production capacity of
70,000 bottles a day.56 However, DADEKO only held the bottling rights to the eastern
part of Denmark (including Copenhagen). The rights for western Denmark were
held by the Aarhus firm of Wilian & Madsen who had no production capacity until
well into 1960.57 This meant that Coca-Cola was available only in the Copenhagen
area when the tax was finally lifted on 1 July 1959. As the newspaper Dagens Nyheder
reported, ‘the Cola War will not hit Funen and Jutland’.58
With these reservations, 1 July was still ‘the Big Coca-Cola Day’, according to
Coca-Cola, that was launched at a well-advertised event in Copenhagen hosted by
the Danish sales president, former professional footballer John Hansen, who was one
of Denmark’s most beloved sport stars.59 The press was mobilised and reported on the
‘war’ in generally favourable terms – except, as one might expect, the communist
daily that characterised Coca-Cola as ‘the American cocaine drink’.60
Sales of cola drinks in July 1959 exceeded all expectations. According to the
newspaper Aktuelt, sales of Coca-Cola at about 5 million bottles were three times
higher than expected.61 More than 9 million bottles of Jolly Cola were sold. These
figures must be compared to an annual sale of 40–50,000 bottles in the years of
the special cola tax. Worries that cola drinks would crowd out other products were
proved wrong. Sales of beer and other soft drinks remained stable while the Minister
of Finance could report that revenue from the soft-drink tax for July 1959 exceeded
that of the same month in 1958 by 48%. According to estimates from Dansk Coladrik,
22% of total soft-drink sales consisted of cola drinks.62
Over the following months sales of Jolly Cola declined, but a year later Dansk
Coladrik reported that annual sales had been an impressive 63.5 million bottles – or
10% to 12% of total soft-drink sales. This was more than Coca-Cola, which can in part
be explained by the fact that Wilian & Madsen only started production at their new
bottling plant in 1960. Dansk Coladrik monitored the market closely and concluded
in a number of analyses from spring and summer in 1960 that the sale of Jolly Cola
55 Dansk Handelsblad, 12 June 1959.
56 Cf. Børsen, 27 June 1959.
57 Cf. Interview with Poul Madsen, former president of Wilian and Madsen, 14 Feb. 2008.
58 Dagens Nyheder, 21 June 1959.
59 Cf. DADEKO Scrapbog, Carlsbergs Arkiv, Copenhagen.
60 Land & Folk, 30 June 1959.
61 Aktuelt, 5 Aug. 1959.
62 Letter dated 9 Sept., held in Stadsarkivet Odense, Albanis Arkiv, box 29.
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did decline in a region when Coca-Cola became available, but only marginally.63 In
the first half of the 1960s, sales of Jolly Cola were approximately 50 million bottles
annually.64 Sales figures for Coca-Cola are not available but the capacities of the two
bottling plants suggest similar numbers. From the mid-1960s sales of cola drinks grew
steadily but so did that of other soft drinks and the market share of cola drinks was
about 20%. According economic historian Hans Christian Johansen, market shares
were relatively stable over the next twenty years, with Coca-Cola having about half
the market, Jolly Cola 40%, while the remaining sales were split between brands
launched by small independent producers.65
From the late 1980s things began to change, with Jolly Cola sales plummeting.
Today, the Danish cola drink market is completely dominated by the two American
giants, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola (introduced into Denmark in 1970). However, it
was no mean feat for the Danish producers to be able to compete successfully with
the world’s most famous brand for 25–30 years.
In a comparative perspective, the success of Jolly Cola is also striking. Local
cola brands were (and are) a well-known phenomenon all over Europe. At the
very best, these brands managed to establish themselves as marginal niche products
when they faced the competition from Coca-Cola (and Pepsi-Cola).66 The most
important explanation for the success of the local Danish cola brand is probably
that it was produced as a joint venture by an extremely well-organised beverage
industry while Coca-Cola Company’s Danish bottlers were newcomers to the market.
Dansk Coladrik had the advantage of the industry’s highly developed infrastructure,
including long-standing contacts with a network of distributors and retailers that
covered every city, village and hamlet of Denmark – while Coca-Cola only became
available nationwide during 1960. This fact probably meant that the media hype
around the launching of the cola war in 1959 benefited the Danish cola. Jolly Cola
also benefited from distribution agreements securing the established beverage industry
a monopoly position in important niche markets such as bars, dance halls and sport
arenas, important venues especially for teenagers and young adults, who were the
primary consumers of cola drinks.67
Local market knowledge helped marketing campaigns. Stressing that Jolly Cola
was ‘the big cola’ offering more for the same money was an important argument
63 This question is discussed several times in the internal correspondence of Dansk Coladrik in the spring
and summer of 1960. This correspondence is held in B29, Albani’s Arkiv, Stadsarkivet Odense.
64 Based on monthly sales statistics for Jolly Cola, 1959–64, in archive of the brewery Slotsmøllen, Kolding
Stadsarkiv.
65 Per Boje and Hans Christian Johansen, Altid på vej . . . Albani Bryggeriernes Historie 1859–84 (Odense:
Odense Universitetsforlag, 1984), 250–1.
66 Among the many examples, one can mention Afri-Cola (Germany), Austro Cola (Austria) and Cuba Cola
(Sweden). See Rainer Gries, ‘Coca-Cola: Globale Werbeikone und Symbol der Amerikanisierung’,
in Gerhard Paul, ed., Das Jahrhundert der Bilder: 1949 bis heute (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht,
2008) 162–9, and ‘Coca-Cola’, available at www.ooegeschichte.at/Coca-Cola.378.0.html (last visited
19 May 2011). A self-promoting version of the history of Afri-Cola is 80 Jahre anders (2011). On Cuba
Cola see www.cubacola.nu/trocaside.asp?id=1 (last visited 7 Nov. 2011).
67 Interview with Poul Madsen 14 Feb. 2008. Madsen was co-founder and CEO of Wilian & Madsen in
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.
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at a time when the era of high economic growth in Denmark was still in its
early phase.68 A combination of local market knowledge and an understanding
of market segmentation explain why Jolly Cola advertisements from the 1960s
in general catered for younger teenage consumers while Coca-Cola focused on
broader consumer groups, having only one product to market, whereas the producers
of Jolly Cola also supplied the Danes with beers. The ambition was to link
Jolly Cola closely to the age-group that felt that they had left childhood behind
while their beer-drinking days were still well ahead of them.69 What must be
stressed, however, is that national themes never made their way into the Jolly Cola
advertisements, while the Coca-Cola campaigns for their part never made explicit use
of American references. In the market place, the Danish cola war was a war waged in
cola language.
Resisting the ‘irresistible empire’?
The Danish encounter with Coca-Cola in the first two post-war decades fell into
three distinct phases. In the initial post-war years, sugar rationing meant that the
Coca-Cola Company did not try to enter the Danish market. When sugar rationing
was lifted in 1953, the introduction of a prohibitive tax on cola drinks undermined
the market completely. Coca-Cola Company and their allies protested repeatedly
against this tax and eventually the tax was rescinded in 1959, opening the third phase
of the very slow Coca-Colonisation of Denmark. When Coca-Cola was marketed
from 1 July 1959 it confronted a strong local player in the Jolly Cola brand produced
by an alliance of the largest breweries and soft-drink producers. This local brand
managed to hold on to a market share of some 40% well into the 1980s, thus keeping
Coca-Cola at least partly at bay in the Danish soft-drink market. In a comparative,
Western European perspective, Denmark offers an exception as Coca-Cola’s local
opponents managed first to block access to the Danish market and then to compete
successfully with the American original for several decades.
In comparison to the well-researched French case of the battle between local
interests and the Coca-Cola Company, ideology was almost absent in Denmark. It
was Coca-Cola’s Alexander Makinsky who first introduced an ideological Cold War
and anti-American reading into the conflict in 1957. Sugar rationing meant that the
availability of the iconic American soft drink simply was not an issue in Denmark
when the term Coca-Colonisation was coined as short hand for American political
and economic imperialism in the late 1940s. There were naturally also strong voices
critical of the USA in Denmark, as demonstrated for example in the criticism of
McCarthyism not only communists, but also from Social Democrats, Social Liberals
68 The importance of the ‘size argument’ was stressed by former president and co-owner of Wilian &
Madsen, Coca-Cola’s bottler in western Denmark, Poul Madsen when we interviewed him in 2008.
69 The focus on the pre-18 age-group is very clear in a series of glossy advertisement that Jolly Cola ran
in Vi Unge, Denmark’s dominant youth magazine, in the mid-1960s.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777312000392
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 29 Jan 2017 at 15:36:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
616 Contemporary European History
and many Liberals.70 However, Coca-Cola had not gained the status of being a strong
symbol for everything American in Denmark. This is clear from the introduction of
the cola tax. Although this tax was clearly protectionist and clearly a Coca-Cola (and
maybe also Pepsi-Cola) tax, anti-American arguments played no role in framing the
pro-tax arguments in 1953 and well beyond. It was argued in strictly economic terms –
those of fiscal revenue, protectionism and trade discrimination. Only when the tax
came under pressure did the pro-tax alliance politicise the issue, suggesting an alien
character in Coca-Cola: unnatural, American and un-Danish. This anti-American
line of arguments did not, however, have any impact on the decision-makers in
government and parliament.
As we argued in the introduction, the tale of Coca-Cola Company’s difficulties
in Denmark does not fit well with the narrative of American consumer capitalism
as an ‘irresistible empire’ conquering European markets from the 1920s that Victoria
de Grazia has offered. As we have documented, resistance and lobbyism from the
well-organised Danish beverage industry managed to block the entry of Coca-Cola
in Denmark until 1959. However, it must also be acknowledged that the market
empire, represented by the Coca-Cola Company, was setting the agenda. It was the
consumer-oriented capitalism that corporate Danish capitalism, embodied by the
beverage industry, felt threatened by and fought against tooth and nail. For them
‘Americanism’ was an economic and political threat to established Danish business
interests. In this struggle, breweries and soft-drink producers demonstrated that they
were a formidable force, able successfully to use their political connections to secure
the introduction of a cola tax blocking the advance of ‘the irresistible empire’, at least
in the Danish soft-drink market.
This victory of the beverage industry was only temporary. From 1954 the Coca-
Cola Company mobilised the American government against the Danish tax. The
Danish breweries were not the only party with good political contacts. However, it
does seem that neither the interventions of the American government nor those
of Coca-Cola’s Danish business partners had any direct impact on the Danish
government in the mid-1950s. At the same time it is clear that this escalation of
the conflict made the defence of the cola tax more difficult in the longer run.
DADEKO, Coca-Cola’s Danish partner, was more successful in lobbying opposition
parties and the Danish media from 1957, but this hardly explains why the political
cola tax alliance collapsed during 1958. A much more plausible explanation is the
changing economic environment, with the need for foreign investments entering
the political agenda in Denmark, and the renewed focus on free trade and economic
liberalisation in the wake of the Treaty of Rome.
This takes us to the third and most fascinating phase of the story, when the beverage
industry, which until 1959 can be characterised as anti-Americanisers who stubbornly
70 For anti-Americanism in Denmark in the first post-war decades, see Nils Arne Sørensen and
Klaus Petersen, ‘Ameri-Danes and Pro-American Anti-Americans’, in Alexander Stephan, ed., The
Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945 (New York: Berghahn,
2006), 134–9.
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fought the entry of American cola interests into the Danish market, launched Jolly
Cola as their plan B. This saw the industry metamorphosing into Americanisers, as
the business model for Dansk Coladrik and Jolly Cola itself were evident examples
of copycatting American originals.71 The industry did not just copy the drink and
the business model. It also fully embraced mass consumerism, American style, when
planning the launch of Jolly Cola.
To put it into the framework of de Grazia’s analysis, the industry’s key protagonists
had come to the conclusion that the market empire was, indeed, irresistible. The
only way to resist it was copying it. This way the Danish beverage industry started
practising the message that would win Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber international
fame when he preached it some years later in his 1967 bestseller, Le défi américain
(The American Challenge). In doing so, the beverage industry became an agent in the
self-Americanisation of Denmark – in line with local producers of chewing gum,





politique fiscale et le Coca-Cola au
Danemark entre 1945 et le début des
années 1960
L’histoire de Coca-Cola au Danemark pendant
les années d’après-guerre sert d’étude de cas pour
examiner les liens étroits liant la politique de la
guerre froide, les intérêts commerciaux et la culture
de la consommation. Pendant de début des années
1950, le secteur danois des boissons exerça une
pression bien organisée pour protéger le marché
domestique des avances du géant américain, et
réussit à faire imposer une taxe particulière sur les
boissons cola, si bien que la manufacture de ces
boissons s’avéra non rentable au Danemark. Vers la
fin des années 1950 cette taxe souffrit une pression
croissante, et elle fut abandonnée en 1959. L’avance
américaine continua après 1959 : la marque danoise
Jolly Cola, établie par les intérêts mêmes qui avaient
six ans auparavant demandé la taxe cola, lança un





Coca-Cola in Dänemark von 1945 bis
zu den frühen sechziger Jahren
Die Geschichte der Coca-Cola Produktion
in Dänemark bietet eine faszinierende Fall-
studie zum Zusammenhang von Kalten Krieg,
Wirtschaftsinteressen und Konsumkultur. In den
frühen fünfziger Jahren versuchte die dänische
Getränkeindustrie mit Erfolg ihren Heimat-
markt gegen den amerikanischen Wettbewerber
abzuschirmen. Das Ergebnis war eine Cola
Steuer, welche die Cola-Produktion in Dänemark
wenig profitabel machte. Diese Steuer geriet
jedoch seit Ende der fünfziger Jahre zunehmend
unter Druck und wurde 1959 abgeschafft. Der
Widerstand gegenüber dem ‘Vordringen Amerikas’
ging jedoch auch nach 1959 weiter. Denn nun
sah sich Coca-Cola dem starken Wettbewerb
der dänischen Firma Jolly Cola gegenüber,
die dieselben Wirtschaftsinteressen repräsentierte,
welche sich Anfang der fünfziger Jahre für eine
Cola Steuer eingesetzt hatten.
71 For the concept ‘Americanisers’, see Volker Berghahn, ‘Conceptualizing the American Impact on
Germany: West German Society and the Problem of Americanization’, paper presented at Conference
at the German Historical Institute, Washington D. C., 1999, available at http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/
ebook/p/2005/ghi_12/www.ghi-dc.org/conpotweb/westernpapers/berghahn.pdf (last visited 7 Nov.
2011).
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